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The World Trade Organization's Decision in United States-
Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations": Round Three
in the Transatlantic Tax Dispute
I. Introduction
The battle over U.S. tax provisions, which provide exemptions
to U.S. exporters, has raged for almost thirty years between the
United States and its international trading partners.' World Trade
Organization (WTO)2 member nations, particularly the European
I Over the years, parties to the dispute have included Canada, India, Japan,
Australia, and others. The chief antagonist throughout, however, has been the European
Union (EU). In 1972, the EU lodged its initial complaint against the United States in
response to then-existing U.S. tax provisions which provided savings for U.S. exporters.
See infra note 64 and accompanying text. The EU filed complaints against the United
States in 1997 and again in 2000. See infra notes 16, 29, and accompanying text.
Members of the Clinton administration speculated that the EU's motivation for bringing
the case was "out of spite" for the United States' use of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) "to pry open markets for imported bananas and hormone-treated beef." Joseph
Kahn, U.S. Loses Dispute on Export Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at Al; see Arthur
Rogers, Zoellick Warns EU of Trade Damage Over Dispute in WTO Over U.S. FSC
Regime, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 778 (2001). However, the dispute over U.S. tax policies
predates both the banana and hormone-treated beef cases. See WTO Dispute Panel
Report on European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, Complaint by the United States, WT/DS27/RIUSA (May 22, 1997),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/banana_e.htm; WTO Dispute Panel Report
on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the
United States, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997), http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop.e/dispu-e/horml.wp5. EU officials said they brought suit because "the long-
standing United States tax breaks give American companies an unfair advantage." Kahn,
supra, at AI.
2 In the late 1940s, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
created to be the "forum for negotiating lower customs duty rates and other trade
barriers." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; WTO, The WTO in Brief, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whatise.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2001). The WTO is an international organization that was established in 1995 and took
the place of GATT, but because the WTO is so new, it uses many of the rules established
by GATT to continue a "multilateral trading system." Id. When a country feels that
another country has violated its rights under a particular agreement that has been signed
by WTO member governments, the aggrieved country can bring the dispute to the WTO,
where independent experts are appointed to interpret the agreements in question. Id.; see
infra note 18.
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Communities (EC), have steadfastly argued that U.S. tax
exemptions constitute illegal export subsidies under international
trade agreements.3 Over the years, the WTO has sided with the
EC, leaving the United States in a seemingly endless cycle of
appealing WTO decisions and amending its tax code.4
The tax exemptions available for certain export income were
designed ostensibly to prevent such income from being subject to
double taxation.5 The tax exclusion, assuming various names and
guises over the last three decades,6 has been used by hundreds of
U.S. exporters, including major corporations such as Microsoft,
General Motors, Boeing, and General Electric to collectively save
billions in tax exemptions.7  The United States' most recent
attempt to bring its tax code into conformity with WTO
agreements, the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion
Act of 2000 (FSC Act),8 was branded a failure by both the EC and
the WTO, because the tax benefits accruing to exporters under the
prior system were largely unchanged.9 As a result, the EC is now
3 See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
4 William M. Funk, The Thirty Years Tax War, 24 TAX NOTES INT'L 65 (2001),
available at LEXIS 2001 WTD 190-17. See infra notes 16-110 and accompanying text
(tracing the trilogy of U.S. tax reforms and WTO decisions).
5 U.S. government officials have supported the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion Act of 2000, commonly called the FSC Act, ETI Act, or simply, Act,
as well as its predecessors as legitimate attempts to "replicate, within the parameters of
the U.S. tax system, the tax treatment afforded . . . [foreign-source] income under
European tax systems." Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
United States to Appeal WTO Ruling on FSC/ETI Tax Law (Oct. 10, 2001), at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/l0/01-80.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
6 Tax exemptions for U.S. exporters initially appeared in the U.S. tax code in 1971
in the form of Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs), which are discussed
infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. The exemptions were then amended in 1984
and became known as Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs). See infra notes 65-74 and
accompanying text. While the FSCs were officially repealed in November 2000 with the
passage of the FSC Act, tax savings for U.S. exporters remained. See infra notes 75-93
and accompanying text.
7 Kahn, supra note 1, at Al; Nancy L. Perkins, Introductory Note to the WTO
Appellate Body's Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) Decision, 39 I.L.M. 714, 714
(2000); Michael Paulson, WTO Case File: Foreign Sales Corporations, SEA1TLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 26, 1999, at A] 7.
8 Pub. L. No. 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000) (enacted) [hereinafter FSC Act].
9 Marcus Desax of the Pestalozzi Lachenal Party in Switzerland commented that
rather than eliminating the subsidies for FSCs, the FSC Act merely disguises them.
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seeking to recover more than $4 billion in trade sanctions from the
United States. l°
In Part II, this Note will explore the facts and holding of the
WTO Panel's initial decision in 1999, the WTO Appellate Body's
decision, and the Panel's most recent opinion in 2001.1" Part III
will examine the background law, 12 and Part IV will provide an
analysis of the Panel's most recent opinion. 3 This Note will then
conclude in Part V that the Panel's decision to reject the latest
attempt by the United States to comply with WTO agreements
adhered to the intent of these agreements, but failed to offer
substantive guidance for member nations to ensure that their tax
systems are WTO compliant. 4 Finally, in Part V this Note will
explore some of the courses of action available to the United
States in the wake of the Panel's most recent opinion."
II. Statement of the Case
A. Procedural History
The current case began in 1997 when the EC, joined by other
countries, 6 requested consultations with the United States, 17 a
Cordia Scott, U.S. Must Make Hard Choices Over Export Tax Incentives, IFA Panelists
Say, 24 TAx NOTES INT'L 218 (2001), available at LEXIS 2001 WTD 195-2.
0 Experts Advise What To Do Now That WTO Has Shot Down FSC Replacement
Act, MANAGING EXPORTS, Sept. 2001, at 5, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation)
(Managing Exports is a monthly newsletter published by the Institute of Management of
Administration (IOMA)). For a description of sanction-imposing procedures, see infra
notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 16-54 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 55-110 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 111-40 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
16 Barbados, Canada, and Japan initially appeared as third parties on the side of the
EC. WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations," WT/DS108/R, para. 1.5 (Oct, 8, 1999), 39 I.L.M. 173, 174 (2000),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/108r.pdf [hereinafter 1999
Panel Report]. In 2001, India and Australia actively joined the case. See WTO Dispute
Panel Report on United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS108/RW,
para. 1.11 (Aug. 20, 2001), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/108-art215
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process governed by WTO dispute-resolution procedures. " The
EC alleged that provisions in the U.S. Internal Revenue Code that
exempt a portion of income earned by foreign sales corporations
(FSC) violated the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM Agreement), 9 which prohibits export-contingent
subsidies.2 °
The consultations failed because the parties were unable to
resolve the dispute. 21 The case was then brought before a Panel
that had been established by a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in
September 1998.22 After meeting with the parties in February
1999,23 the Panel handed down its decision and agreed with the EC
that FSC tax exemptions constituted export subsidies prohibited
under Article 3. 1(a) of the SCM Agreement, ordering the United
States to withdraw the FSC subsidies by October 1, 2000.24
Subsequently, the United States filed an appeal in December
1999.25
.e.pdf [hereinafter 2001 Panel Report]. The specific arguments of Canada, India,
Australia, and Japan are found in the Annexes to the Panel Decision but will not be
addressed in this Note. See generally 2001 Panel Report, supra, Annexes B, E,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/distabe.htm.
17 1999 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 1.1.
18 See Susan M. Hainsworth, An Insider's Guide to the World Trade Organization,
in 4 INT'L TRADE L. & REG. (Supp. 1 1998) (explaining the WTO dispute settlement
procedures).
19 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 231 (1999) (citing the Apr. 15, 1994
"Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures" in Annex IA: Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods) [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. The Uruguay Round
was the final series of trade negotiations held under GATT that led to the creation of the
WTO. WTO, supra note 2. The SCM Agreement is part of the GATT and is discussed
infra at notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
20 See 1999 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 3.2(c). The EC also claimed that the
alleged subsidies in the U.S. tax code violated provisions of the Agreement on
Agriculture. Id.; see generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 19, at 33, 39
(1999) (citing the Apr. 15, 1994 "Agreement on Agriculture" in Annex IA: Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods). The arguments advanced and the WTO's disposition of
the agricultural claims exceed the scope of this Note.
21 1999 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 1.3.
22 Id. para. 1.4.
23 Id. para. 1.7.
24 Id. paras. 8.1(a), 8.3, 8.8.
25 WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign
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In February 2000, the Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's
findings with respect to the violation of Article 3.1(a) and the
Panel's directive to the United States to amend FSC policies to
comply with the SCM Agreement.26  The United States then
adopted the FSC Act in November 2000, purportedly to conform
to WTO agreements and the WTO directives. However, the EC
immediately claimed that the FSC Act failed to correct the
prohibitive practices of the FSC system28  and requested
consultations with the United States for its failure to comply with
the WTO's prior ruling.2 9 After these consultations failed, the
parties returned to the Panel, and in August 2001, the Panel issued
its second ruling regarding the validity of U.S. tax schemes.3"
B. The Panel's Most Recent Decision
To determine whether the Act violated the SCM Agreement,
the Panel first had to find that a subsidy existed and then decide
whether the subsidy was contingent upon exporting.3' Under the
SCM Agreement, a subsidy is deemed to exist when "revenue that
is otherwise due" to a member nation's government is
Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/AB/R, para. 4 (Feb. 24, 2000), 39 I.L.M. 717, 719
(2000), available at http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-e/dispu-e/621d.pdf [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report].
26 Id. paras. 177(a), 178. Just two days before the United States was supposed to
have the FSC subsidies completely withdrawn, it requested and received an extension
until November 1, 2000. 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 1.3.
27 Pub. L. No. 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000) (enacted).
28 The EU Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, commented that the key distinction
between the FSC Repeal Act and the FSC regime was "the removal of the requirement to
create a 'paper' company in a tax haven in order to benefit from the tax break."
Delegation of the European Commission to the United States, Pascal Lamy, EU
Commission says FSC Proposal Still WTO-Incompatible (Sept. 1, 2000), at
http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2000/2000050.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
29 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 1.6.
30 Id. paras. 1.7-1.9. Upon the EC's request, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
again referred the matter to the Panel, which issued an "interim report" on June 22, 2001.
2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, paras. 1.9, 1.13. After the parties each responded to
this written report, the Panel issued its final decision on August 20, 2001. Id. paras. 9.1,
9.2.
31 Id. paras. 8.2-8.3.
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"foregone." 32  According to the Panel, determining whether
revenue otherwise due has been foregone requires a comparison
between the tax revenues actually received by the government and
the revenues the government could have collected but for the tax
exclusion.33 The "but for" part of the analysis requires an
examination of the prevailing domestic standard of taxation of the
member nation.34 In contrast to the United States' characterization
of its own tax system,35 the Panel viewed the prevailing domestic
standard of the United States as one which taxes all income earned
by U.S. taxpayers, regardless of its source.36 Comparing its view
of the prevailing domestic standard with the taxable income under
the FSC Act, the Panel found that revenue otherwise due was
foregone via the tax exemption and thus constituted a subsidy.37
The Panel then evaluated whether the subsidy was contingent
upon export performance.38 While neither party disputed the fact
that there were ways to qualify for the tax exclusion other than
exporting U.S.-produced goods,39 they debated the ramifications of
32 SCM Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii).
33 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 8.10.
34 Id. paras. 8.10-8.11.
35 Id. para. 8.6. The United States argued that the revised definition of gross
income included in the Act represented the prevailing domestic standard of U.S. taxation
by which the question of whether income has been foregone should be judged. Id. (citing
First Written Submission of the United States, id. Annex A-2, para. 77,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu -e/distab-e.htm). According to the United
States, since it "lacks the statutory authority to tax outside the definition of 'gross
income,' there is no general rule of taxation that would apply 'but for' the definition of
gross income." Id. Thus, the United States argued, but for the FSC Act, extraterritorial
income would not be subject to taxation or would be taxed at a reduced rate. Id. (citing
Annex A-2, paras. 101-05).
36 Id. paras. 8.24-8.25.
37 Id. para. 8.30.
38 Id. para. 8.53.
39 Other ways to qualify for the exclusion under the FSC Act include
manufacturing and selling abroad or by selling services abroad. Id. para. 8.50. The
United States provides a more detailed list of alternate methods of qualifying without
exporting which includes:
the sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying foreign trade property; the
lease or rental of qualifying foreign trade property for use by the lessee outside
the United States; the provision of services which are related and subsidiary to
any sale, exchange or other disposition of qualifying foreign trade property; the
provision of services which are related and subsidiary to any lease or rental of
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that fact.40 Citing prior WTO decisions, the Panel found that the
FSC Act did not have to contain exclusively export contingent
requirements in order to find that a prohibited subsidy exists.4'
The Panel determined that the FSC Act was contingent upon
export performance by pointing to "the differential treatment
provided for in the Act-that is, if U.S.-produced goods are
exported, the subsidy is available, while if they are sold in the
domestic market, it is not., 42 Despite the addition of non-export-
based means to achieve the tax exemption, the Panel concluded
that the United States failed to cure the problem of subsidizing
offshore activities that existed under the FSC regime.43
Having determined that the FSC Act contained export
subsidies, the Panel then addressed the United States' affirmative
defense. The United States argued that, even assuming such
subsidies existed, they were not prohibited due to a footnote in the
SCM Agreement that excepted "measures to avoid the double
taxation of foreign-source income" from the list of export
subsidies."
qualifying foreign trade property; the provision of engineering or architectural
services for construction of projects located (or proposed for location) outside
the United States; or the performance of managerial services for a person other
than a related person in furtherance of the production of foreign trading gross
receipts.
Id. Annex A-2, para. 118.
40 According to the EC, the fact that the exclusion can be achieved by other means
does not cure the export contingency for U.S.-produced goods; but the United States
views the existence of other means to gain the exclusion as erasing any export
contingency from the FSC Act. 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 8.52.
41 Id. para. 8.64 (discussing the WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada-
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 20, 1999),
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/4064d.pdf).
42 Id. para. 8.72.
43 Id. para. 8.70. To clarify this point the Panel used the analogy that "a Member
does not eliminate an export subsidy on apples by also granting a subsidy on oranges that
is not contingent upon export performance." Id.
44 SCM Agreement, supra note 19, Annex I, item (e), n.59; 2001 Panel Report,
supra note 16, para. 8.76. The Panel stated that a measure must satisfy three components
to fall within the scope of the exception found in footnote 59. The measure must be
designed with the following three purposes in mind: "(i) 'to avoid'; (ii) 'the double
taxation'; (iii) 'of foreign-source income' earned by the enterprises of the Member
concerned or of another Member." 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 8.91. The
parties agreed on the meaning of "'double taxation"' but disputed the definitions of the
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. [Vol. 27
In determining whether the FSC Act met the "to avoid"
requirement of the claimed exception, the Panel evaluated a
combination of factors and reviewed the "overall structure, design
and operation of the Act."45 The Panel found the FSC Act overly
broad in that it excluded from taxation income that would rarely
be taxable outside the United States.46 Conversely, the Panel
labeled the FSC Act overly narrow in other aspects, as it failed to
include a range of income potentially subject to taxation in other
jurisdictions. The Panel found it particularly difficult to square
these inconsistencies in coverage with the United States' asserted
desire to enact a "prophylactic" measure. 48 Having found the "to
avoid" requirement lacking, the Panel concluded that the FSC Act
was not a measure designed to avoid double taxation of foreign-
source income.49
other two terms. Id. para. 8.92. The Panel then determined that "'foreign-source
income' . . . [referred] to certain income susceptible to 'double taxation."' Id. para. 8.93.
45 Id. para. 8.95.
46 Id. para. 8.97. For example, many countries only tax business profits of an
enterprise when "that enterprise carries on business through a permanent establishment,
and only to the extent those profits are attributable to that permanent establishment." Id.
para. 8.99. Unlike the former FSC regime, the FSC Act does not require a permanent
establishment outside of the United States in order to qualify for the tax exclusion. Id.
para. 8.100.
47 Id. para. 8.104. The Panel deemed the "highly selective conditions" guarding
access to the exemption and the disqualification of specific property as "manifestly and
entirely unrelated to the source of the income or the potential for double taxation." Id.
Additionally, the Panel noted that while "the United States has numerous bilateral tax
treaties with other countries that rely upon the foreign tax credit approach to avoiding
double taxation," the FSC Act was not "designed to cover, in particular, situations where
such a tax treaty" was absent. Id. para. 8.105.
48 Id. para. 8.103. The United States asserted that the language of footnote 59
indicated that the SCM Agreement did not prohibit WTO members from taking
"prophylactic steps" to ensure that their taxpayers were not victims of double taxation.
Id. para. 8.82 (quoting Annex D-3, para. 22).
49 Id. para. 8.107. Therefore, the Panel found no need to analyze the relationship
between footnote 59 and footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement. Id. para. 8.108. Earlier in
its decision, the Panel explained that in order for the United States to prevail on its
claimed affirmative defense, the Panel Would have to find both that "the Act is a measure
designed to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income within the meaning of
.. . footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement," and also that "footnote 59 falls within the
scope of footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement.' Id. para. 8.80. Footnote 5 states that
"[m]easures referred to in Annex I," which is where footnote 59 is found, do not
constitute "export subsidies [that] shall be prohibited under this or any other provision of
this Agreement." SCM Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.1(a) n.5.
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In addition to finding that the FSC Act included prohibited
export contingent subsidies, the Panel also found that the FSC Act,
through the foreign articles/labor limitation in the definition of
"qualifying foreign trade property," favored domestically
produced goods over like imported goods in violation of Article
111:4 of GATT 1994.5" The United States argued that the EC
misunderstood the 50% foreign articles/labor limitation of the FSC
Act and noted that a product can satisfy the requirement even if
100% of its content is foreign. 5' The Panel held that a method
under the FSC Act for obtaining the tax exclusion through the sole
use of foreign inputs did not overcome the preference for domestic
goods created by the FSC Act; only the use of domestic goods
could assure compliance with the 50% limitation.52 Since the FSC
50 Id. paras. 9.1(d), 8.123. The applicable portion of Article 111:4 of GATT 1994
provides that
[t]he products of the territory of any Member imported into the territory of any
other Member shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations, and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use.
GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, VI-1994-4000, at 22 (June 1994).
51 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 8.152. In explaining the operation of the
fifty percent rule, the United States related that the
rule takes into account only the value of foreign articles and foreign direct
labour cost used in producing a finished product. It does not limit foreign value.
Thus, the remaining 50 per cent of fair market value of the finished product can
be attributed to non-tangible elements, including intellectual property rights,
goodwill, capital, marketing, distribution, and other services, which may be of
either US or foreign origin.
Id. Annex A-2, para. 201.
The United States then provided the following example to illustrate the operation of
the rule:
Assume a product consists of 100 per cent foreign articles and is manufactured
using only foreign direct labour. Assume further that the sum of value of the
foreign articles and foreign direct labour costs is $200. Assume also that,
because of significant foreign brand name value and foreign capital costs, the
fair market value of the product (i.e., the price at which it can be sold to
consumers) is $450. The sale of such a product qualifies for the exclusion
under the Act, notwithstanding the fact that no'US goods are involved, because
$200 is less than 50 per cent of $450.
Id. Annex A-2, para. 202.
52 Id. paras. 8.156-57. Moreover, limits were imposed on the fair market value of
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Act resulted in foreign products receiving "less favourable"
treatment than domestic counterparts in violation of Article 111:4,53
the Panel held that the United States, in addition to violating the
SCM Agreement, failed to bring its tax treatment of export income
into compliance with its WTO obligations.54
III.Background
A. Setting the Stage: Opposing Systems of Taxation
The U.S. tax regime is based on a worldwide taxation system
in which income earned worldwide by U.S. citizens and residents
is subject to U.S. income tax.55 Income earned by foreign
corporations outside the United States56 is generally not subject to
U.S. taxation.57 Such income, however, may be taxed if it is
"effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business
within the United States. 58  Conversely, under the territorial
system, predominantly used by European countries, "only income
earned within the territory of the nation-whether by domestic or
foreign corporations-is subject to taxation. 59  The aim of the
trilogy of tax exemptions has been to provide incentives for U.S.
companies to export U.S.-produced goods by replicating
advantages accruing to exporters under territorial systems, chiefly
the avoidance of double taxation of income earned from export
sales.6"
goods that could be "derived from imported products (and foreign labour)" which were
not placed on domestic products and labour. Id. para. 8.155.
53 Id. para. 8.158.
54 Id. para. 9.1.
55 Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 6.
56 This income is generally referred to as "foreign-source income." Id. para. 7.
57 Id.
58 Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 882(a) (2000)).
59 Perkins, supra note 7, at 714.
60 Id.; see also, John R. Magnus et al., International Legal Developments in
Review: 1999: Business Regulation, 34 INT'L LAW. 501 (2000) (noting that the DISC and
FSC provisions
were intended to offset, to a limited extent, the competitive disadvantage to
U.S.-based producers arising from the fact that the indirect taxes heavily
utilized by governments in Europe and elsewhere around the world could be
border-adjusted under multilateral trade rules, whereas the direct taxes (income
[Vol. 27
2001] ROUND THREE IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TAX DISPUTE 373
B. Part One: Domestic International Sales Corporations
The United States' initial attempt to provide tax savings for
U.S. exporters was through the use of Domestic International
Sales Corporations (DISCs). 61  Under the DISC regime, U.S.
entities could set up subsidiaries and then channel export sales
through them to obtain tax exemptions on such income.62
Shareholders of DISCs enjoyed tax savings because a portion of
the dividends they received from foreign sales were tax exempt.
63
In 1972, pursuant to an EC objection to U.S. tax exemptions
afforded to DISCs, a GATT dispute settlement panel found that
the exemptions constituted an illegal export subsidy under Article
XVI:4 of GATT 1947.64
C. Part Two: Foreign Sales Corporations
In 1984, the United States replaced the DISC legislation with
the FSC tax scheme.65 The FSCs were "foreign corporations
taxes) principally relied upon by the United States could not).
Id. at n.6. Under the EC's value added tax (VAT) regime, an exporter pays no tax on
revenue from export sales as they are exempt from tax. Through FSCs, the United States
attempted to procure similar benefits for U.S. exporters by allowing income tax
exemptions on export sales income. Matthew J. Clark, WTO Ruling:; FSCs Are a
Prohibited Export Subsidy; Steps Exporters Should Take, MANAGING EXPORTS, May 3,
2000, at 1, http://web.lexis-nexis.comluniverse (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
61 Funk, supra note 4, at 66; see supra note 6.
62 Funk, supra note 4, at 68.
63 See id.
64 Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 20. Article XVI:4 of GAIT 1947
states that an "exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges of taxes, other than
charges in conne[ct]ion with importation or indirect taxes levied at one or several stages
on the same goods if sold for internal consumption" constitutes an export subsidy.
Subsidies: Provisions of Article XVI:4, Nov. 19, 1960, GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at
187 (1961); Perkins, supra note 7, at 714. In response to the EC request for
consultations in 1972, the United States responded by requesting consultations with
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, "contending that if the DISC measure were an
export subsidy, then the tax exemptions prov.ided.by those countries for foreign-source
income were also export subsidies." Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 20.
The Panel reports from these four cases came to be known as the "Tax Legislation
Cases." Id.
65 WALTER H. DIAMOND, FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION vii (1987). While the
United States asserted that FSCs were a means to avoid double taxation of U.S. exporters
and companies located abroad, the EC rejected this justification, stating that "FSCs are
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responsible for certain sales-related activities in connection with
the sale or lease of goods produced in the United States for export
outside the United States."66 Provisions in the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code (I.R.C.) allowed these offshore companies to
exempt a percentage of their earnings from the sale of U.S.
products outside of the United States.67  Generally, a U.S.
company would funnel its overseas sales activities through a
subsidiary and avoid paying U.S. taxes on a percentage of such
income. 68 Additionally, no taxes were levied on FSC income that
was transferred from the subsidiary to its parent company.69
Both qualification as an FSC and exclusion from income
taxation demanded compliance with a web of I.R.C.
requirements. 7' For example, the FSC had to "maintain an office
in a foreign jurisdiction' ' 71 and be formed under the laws of a
country that shared tax information with the United States.72 Once
established, the FSC had to satisfy additional requirements
including limitations on the amount of foreign inputs that could
comprise the fair market value of goods produced by the FSC.73
The WTO Panel's ruling in October 1999 that FSCs violated
international trade agreements signaled their demise.74
typically established in tax havens where no income tax is paid at all." EU Commission,
EU Comments on Tax Discrimination in Latest Report on U.S. Trade Barriers, (Oct 10,
2001), LEXIS 2001 WTD 196-18, para. 235 [hereinafter EU Commission].
66 Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 11.
67 Clark, supra note 60, at 1. The amount of the tax exemption could be "as great
as 15 to 30% on gross income from exporting." International Trade Administration,
Foreign Sales Corporations: A Tax Incentive for U.S. Exporters, at
http//www.ita.doc.gov/legal/fsc.html (last updated Sept. 1996).
68 Kahn, supra note 1, at Al. U.S. government attorneys noted in a report that
establishing an FSC is "[o]ne of the most important steps a U.S. exporter can take to
reduce federal income tax on export-related income." International Trade
Administration, supra note 67.
69 Kahn, supra note 1, at Al.
70 Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 12.
71 Funk, supra note 4, at 68.
72 Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 12.
73 I.R.C. § 927(a)(2) (2000); see also Funk, supra note 4, at 69 (summarizing
additional regulations imposed on FSCs).
74 See 1999 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 8.3.
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D. Part Three: The FSC Repeal Act of 2000
The FSC Act,75 adopted on November 15, 2000, repealed
portions of the I.R.C. pertaining to the taxation of FSCs in an
effort to comply with WTO obligations.76 While FSCs may no
longer be formed, 7 the FSC Act still provides tax exemptions for
U.S. exporters.
The FSC Act adds § 114, which excludes extraterritorial
income from gross income,78 subject to the qualification that such
income is qualifying foreign trade income.79 Extraterritorial
income is defined as "the gross income of the taxpayer attributable
to foreign trading gross receipts (as defined in § 942) of the
taxpayer."8 ° Foreign trading gross receipts8' are the gross receipts
of the taxpayer, resulting from the sale or exchange of qualifying
foreign trade property, or the lease or rental of such property for
use outside of the United States.82 Qualifying foreign trade
property is property
(A) manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted within or
outside the United States,
(B) held primarily for sale, lease or rental, in the ordinary course
of trade or business for direct use, consumption, or disposition
75 Pub. L. No. 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000) (enacted).
76 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 2.1.
77 Under the FSC Act, no new FSCs may be created after September 30, 2000.
FSC Act § 5(b)(1). For an FSC in existence on September 30, 2000, the FSC Act does
not affect its transactions as long as they occur before January 1, 2002 or after December
31, 2001 pursuant to a binding contract. Id. § 5(c)(1)(A)-(B).
78 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 114(a).
79 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 114(b).
[Q]ualifying foreign trade income means, with respect to any transaction, the
amount of gross income which, if excluded, will result in a reduction of the
taxable income of the taxpayer from such transaction equal to the greatest of
(A) 30 percent of the foreign sale and leasing income derived by the taxpayer
from such transaction, (B) 1.2 percent of the foreign trading gross receipts
derived by the taxpayer from the transaction, or (C) 15 percent of the foreign
trade income derived by the taxpayer from the transaction.
I.R.C. § 941(a)(l)(A)-(C).
80 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 114(e).
81 See 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 2.8 (discussing foreign economic
process requirements).
82 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 942(a)(1).
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outside the United States, and
(C) not more than 50 percent of fair market value of which is
attributable to
(i) articles manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted
outside the United States, and
(ii) direct costs for labor performed outside the United
States.83
To ensure consistent tax treatment, the FSC Act clarified that
property manufactured, produced, or extracted outside the United
States that met the definition of qualifying foreign trade property
would be deemed to be such only if the aforementioned activities
were done by a domestic corporation, a U.S. citizen or resident, or
a foreign corporation subjecting itself to U.S. taxation.84 Property
specifically excluded from the definition of qualifying foreign
trade property includes oil or gas,85 intellectual property,86 and any
property deemed by the President to be in "short supply."87
As noted by the Panel, the "definitions of qualifying foreign
trade property and foreign trading gross receipts . . . contain at
least two requirements that must be satisfied in order for a
taxpayer to qualify for the exclusion from taxation., 88 First, goods
produced either inside or outside the United States must be held
primarily for sale, lease, rental, or other disposition outside the
United States.89 Second, the cost of such goods cannot be
attributable to costs for foreign materials or labor that exceed fifty
percent of the goods' fair market value.9 °
In contrast to the FSC system, the FSC Act expanded the class
of exporters who could potentially benefit from tax exclusions on
export income.9' One significant alteration of the FSC Act is the
83 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 943(a)(1) (emphasis added).
84 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 943(a)(2).
85 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 943(a)(3)(C).
86 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 943(a)(3)(B).
87 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 943(a)(4).
88 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 2.7.
89 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 943(a)(1); see also supra note 81 and accompanying text.
90 FSC Act § 3; I.R.C. § 943(a)(1).
91 Replacement FSC Act Extends Tax Exemption to More Exporters, MANAGING
EXPORTS, Apr. 2001, at 7, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). More specifically,
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deletion of the requirement that the source of the excluded income
be a separate entity with a permanent establishment outside the
United States.92 Without the requirement of a separate affiliate to
reap the tax exclusion, U.S. exporters can save "the cost and
burden of opening and maintaining offshore FSCs." 93
E. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement)
Subsidies granted by national governments to their domestic
industries and companies have "always been a matter of great
controversy and discord between the participants in the world
trading system." 94 As tariff barriers eroded, governments began
using subsidies as a subtle method of protecting domestic
industries. 95 The only limitation placed on GATT member nations
under Article XVI of GATT 1947 was an "obligation that all
subsidies which operated to increase exports or decrease imports
had to be notified to the Organisation. 96 As a result, there was no
meaningful international regulation or discipline on the granting of
subsidies.
Over the years, the subsidy problem compounded. 97 In 1991,
after numerous studies, proposals, and negotiations, GATT issued
the SCM Agreement, which increased regulations on the granting
of subsidies and installed more effective enforcement mechanisms
for combating prohibited subsidies.98 Under the SCM Agreement,
"[tax benefits are retained for current FSC shareholders and even extended to a broader
class of U.S. companies, including individuals, S corporations, partnerships, and
branches." Id.
92 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 8.101.
93 New Tax Bill Favorable to Exporters Using Foreign Sales Corps., MANAGING
EXPORTS, Oct. 2000, at 4, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
94 Craig Pouncey & Kees Jan Kuilwijk, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies: An
Overview of Residual Problems-Part 1, 4 INT'LTRADE L. & REG. 171 (1998).
95 Id. at 171.
96 Id. at 172.
97 See id. (discussing the growing subsidy problem prior to the enactment of the
SCM Agreement).
98 Recognizing this increased regulation, the Panel remarked, "the object and
purpose of the SCM Agreement could ... be summarised as the establishment of
multilateral disciplines 'on the premise that some forms of government intervention
distort international trade, [or] have the potential to distort [international] trade."' 2001
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a subsidy is deemed to exist if there is a financial contribution by a
government, such as the foregoing of government revenue that is
otherwise due.99 Member nations are also prohibited from
granting or maintaining "subsidies contingent ... upon the use of
domestic over imported goods."' 00 The provision at the heart of
the current dispute is Article 3.1(a), which prohibits "subsidies
contingent . . . upon export performance."' 0' Article 3.1(a)
references a list of export subsidies, which includes a prohibition
against "[t]he full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral
specifically related to exports, of direct taxes ... paid or payable
by industrial or commercial enterprises."'' 0 2 An exception to this
prohibition, which the United States claimed as an affirmative
defense, is granted for measures taken by a member nation to
"avoid the double taxation of foreign source income., 103
Article 4 contains the remedies available to a member nation
who believes that another member nation has "granted or
maintained" a prohibited subsidy." 04 The first step is to hold
consultations with the alleged offending nation.105 If an agreement
is not reached, a request can then be made to the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) to establish a Panel. 10 6 If the Panel finds
that a prohibited subsidy exists, it recommends to the offending
nation that it "withdraw the subsidy without delay."'0 7  After
circulating its report among the parties,'0 8 the Panel issues its
report to the DSB, which adopts it within thirty days unless one of
the parties files an appeal or the DSB "decides by consensus not to
Panel Report, supra note 16, at n.107 (quoting WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada-
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, para. 9.119 (Apr. 14,
1999), www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/70r.pdf).
99 SCM Agreement, supra note 19, art. L.I(a)(1)(ii).
100 Id. art. 3.1(b).
101 Id. art. 3.1(a).
102 Id. Annex I (e).
103 Id. Annex I n.59.
104 Id. art. 4.1.
105 Id. art. 4.3.
106 Id. art. 4.4.
107 Id. art. 4.7.
108 Id. art. 4.6.
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adopt the report."' 9 If the offending nation does not withdraw the
subsidy within a specified time period, the "DSB shall grant
authorization to the complaining Member to take appropriate
countermeasures."' 10
IV. Analysis
The Panel's latest decision in the ongoing controversy over the
existence of export contingent subsidies in the U.S. tax code
focuses on compliance with the intent of international trade
agreements rather than mere technical compliance with them. "'
This purpose-guided approach employed by the Panel is especially
evident in its analysis of whether the FSC Act: results in the
foregoing of revenue otherwise due; violates Article 111:4 of
GATT 1994; or constitutes a valid measure to avoid the double
taxation of foreign-source income." 2
In determining whether the FSC Act resulted in the foregoing
of revenue otherwise due, the Panel flatly refused to allow the
United States to circumvent the "but for" test by claiming
technical compliance with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement
through its assertion that "what is claimed to be otherwise due was
never due in the first place." 113  The Panel balked at the
"manifestly absurd" idea of construing either the "but for" test or
the term "otherwise due" in such a "narrow or formalistic
manner." 114  While the Panel found many faults with the U.S.
application of the "but for" test, its chief concern appeared to be
that permitting the U.S. scheme would seriously undermine the
109 Id. art. 4.8.
110 Id. art. 4.10. The footnote to this article clarifies that if the DSB finds subsidies
prohibited by the SCM agreement, then "disproportionate" countervailing measures are
not permitted. Id. at n.9. Furthermore, prior to the imposition of countervailing
measures (e.g., sanctions), a party may request an arbitration in which the arbitrator
determines the appropriateness of such measures. Id. art. 4.11.
IIi Funk, supra note 4, at 75. William Funk suggests that "the text of the WTO
rules may not have been violated" because under the FSC Act, "the United States now
has a general rule that extraterritorial income is excluded or it has no general rule." Id.
He concludes that "[e]ither way, the exclusion is not technically an exception to a
general rule." Id.
112 See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
113 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 8.36.
114 Id. para. 8.15.
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purpose of the SCM Agreement." 5 The Panel's adherence to the
intent of the SCM Agreement enables it to avoid rewarding the
nation most adept at discovering technical loopholes and
manipulating its tax laws at the expense of promoting a level
playing field for international trade. 1 6
While the Panel asserted that deciding what is "'otherwise
due' depends on the rules of taxation that each Member, by its
own choice, establishes for itself," it rejected the U.S.
characterization of its own system of taxation."7  The Panel
envisioned future cases in which discerning the "'prevailing
domestic standard' for a particular tax regime may be a
particularly exacting exercise" but stated that the SCM
Agreement's terms are generally applicable." 8 The Panel suggests
then that all member nations are free to develop their own systems
of taxation and that all member nations are bound by the terms of
the SCM Agreement, but the application of the SCM Agreement
to a particular nation's tax system will lie within the WTO's
discretion. 19
Since the Panel concluded that the FSC Act was not a measure
designed "to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income"
as the United States had argued, the Panel left the viability of this
115 Id. para. 8.39. The Panel reflected these concerns in its statement that the U.S.
interpretation of the "but for" test "would offer governments 'carte-blanche' to evade
any effective disciplines, thereby creating fundamental uncertainty and unpredictability."
Id. Such a result would be "inherently contradictory" to the SCM Agreement's goal of
"disciplining trade-distorting subsidies in a way that provided legally binding security of
expectations to Members." Id.
116 In its rebuke of the U.S. application of the "but for" test, the Panel commented
that the U.S. method would allow governments to provide "financial contributions ...
simply by modulating the 'outer boundary' of its 'tax jurisdiction' or by manipulating
the definition of the tax base . . . so that there could never be a foregoing of revenue
'otherwise due."' Id. para. 8.39.
117 Id. para. 8.10 (emphasis added).
118 Id. para. 8.29. The generally applicable nature of the terms of the SCM
Agreement led the Panel to reject the idea that "they are only to be applied when the
results are self-evident." Id.
119 See id. paras. 8.9-8.30. The Panel related that a "Member, in principle, has the
sovereign authority to tax (or not to tax) any particular categories of revenue it wishes."
Id. para. 8.10. However, the Panel noted that "the Member must respect its WTO
obligations," which include adherence to the terms of the SCM Agreement. Id. Having
established these two principles, the Panel then applied its own analysis to determine the
"prevailing domestic standard" of taxation in the United States. Id. paras. 8.9-8.30.
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affirmative defense to using a prohibited export subsidy wholly
unanswered. 120 Rather than accepting the U.S. claim that the FSC
Act was designed to avoid double taxation of foreign-source
income, the Panel rigorously analyzed the actual operation of the
FSC Act to determine if it was compatible with its purported
purpose. 12' Thus, while the availability of an affirmative defense
to Article 3.1(a) violations is unknown, the Panel added teeth to
the threshold for reaching that possibility: the "to avoid"
requirement.
Applying an intent-based inquiry, the Panel found that the FSC
Act's foreign articles/labor limitation violated Article I1:4 of the
GATT 1994.122 Accordingly, the Panel rebuffed U.S. attempts to
legitimize illegal subsidies by coupling them with permitted export
practices and then claiming compliance with formal rules. 123
Citing previous WTO decisions, the Panel insisted on compliance
with the spirit of Article 111:4, which imposes "an obligation
addressed to governments requiring that they ensure equality of
competitive opportunities to domestic and like imported
products." 1
24
Although it was hotly debated by the parties, the Panel gave
scant attention to the United States' contention that through its
disputed tax measures, it was attempting to replicate for U.S.
companies the tax benefits enjoyed by European companies under
the territorial system predominantly used in EC member states.
125
The EC strongly disagreed with the U.S. characterization of EC
120 Id. para. 8.105.
121 Id. paras. 8.76-8.106. See supra notes 31-54 and accompanying text.
122 Id. para. 8.158.
123 Id. para. 8.157.
124 Id. para. 8.159 n.270. Article 111:4 of GATT 1994 received similar treatment in
prior WTO cases. See WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada-Certain Measures
Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, para. 10.84
(May 31, 2000), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/2823d.pdf (stating that
"the concept of the 'no less favorable treatment' obligation in Art. 111:4 is an obligation
addressed to governments to ensure effective equality of competitive opportunities
between domestic and imported products"); WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS1l/AB/R, at
16-17 (Oct. 4, 1996), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/alcohpr.wp5
(discussing the relationship between measures to protect domestic production and GATT
provisions).
125 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, Annex A-2 para. 39.
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member states' tax systems. 126 The EC distinguished the typical
tax systems of its members from the FSC Act, stating, "[c]ontrary
to the situation under the U.S. FSC Replacement scheme,
exemptions in the EC member states do not depend on whether the
product on which the income arises is exported or not."'
127
This appears to be the crux of the conflict. Most EC member
states do not tax income earned outside their borders and there are
no overt incentives to export goods in order to receive such tax
treatment. 128  Conversely, in the United States, all taxpayers'
income, regardless of where it was earned, is generally subject to
taxation unless an exception in the tax code applies. 29 Thus, in
the United States, there are great tax saving incentives to qualify
for an exception. Although the United States stressed that there
were ways to attain the exemption without exporting,3 ° the
method most likely to result in achieving a coveted exception via
the FSC Act is exporting U.S.-produced goods. 131
In its closing statement, the United States appealed to the
intent-based approach often used by the WTO with its argument
that "territorial limits found in many European systems are
different mechanisms for achieving a fundamentally similar
result" as that found in the FSC Act. 3 2 Thus, the United States
126 Id. Annex C-I para. 40. While the EC had "no intention to defend the tax
systems of its Member States" it assured that all EC members "comply fully with their
international obligations." Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Perkins, supra note 7, at 714. In addition to tax exemptions, the U.S. tax code,
like the codes in other countries with worldwide systems of taxation, includes deductions
and credits which exclude certain income from taxation. Scott, supra note 9, at 219.
130 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
131 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 8.74; see Lee A. Sheppard, Eye Poking
Over the FSC Replacement, 90 TAX NOTES 1288 (Mar. 5, 2001), available at LEXIS
2001 WTD 44-18 (noting that under the Act, there are situations, such as when a
taxpayer is manufacturing within the United States, in which the taxpayer can qualify for
the subsidy only by exporting) Id. at 1290.
132 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, Annex D-4 para. 18; see Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Tax, Trade, and Harmful Tax Competition, 21 TAX NOTES INT'L 2841 (Dec.18,
2000), LEXIS 2000 WTD 243-18 (suggesting that while the ". . . Europeans have argued
that the exemption of foreign source income in Europe is part of the normative baseline,"
it is difficult to define that baseline, since European regimes "contain many worldwide
features" and therefore "it is possible to argue that there is 'foregone revenue"' under
such regimes). Id. at 2843. However, Trade Counselor of the European Commission
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reasoned it was "unlikely that the drafters of the SCM Agreement
intended to invalidate all of these systems." 133 The United States
then warned that it would consider a decision "that discriminates
between tax systems even though the systems generate a similar
economic result" as inconsistent with fundamental WTO
principles of fairness incumbent upon the Panel.1
34
In response to the arguments between the parties as well as the
U.S. challenge, the Panel merely stated that the WTO did not
attempt to impose a particular tax regime upon member nations;
rather, it required that the regime chosen by a member comply
with a member's WTO obligations.135  By recognizing the
autonomy of member nations to design their tax regimes and
acknowledging the legitimate goal of taking measures to prevent
double taxation, the Panel suggests that a worldwide taxation
system that adjusts to avoid double taxation is possible under
WTO rules. 136 The Panel, however, failed to offer any substantive
guidance as to how a member nation might accomplish such a feat
without running afoul of the SCM Agreement.
Since its establishment in 1995, the WTO has not decided a
case with such potentially tremendous financial penalties and
repercussions as the present case.137 The continued vitality of the
WTO, as well as its validity to issue decisions having such a
Delegation, Bert van Barlingen, rejected the U.S. justification for the FSC Act,
explaining that "[i]n European countries, export income," which he notes is not
synonymous with foreign income, "is subject to the same tax as income generated by
domestic sales." Bert van Barlingen, Speech at the PricewaterhouseCoopers Seminar on
FSC Replacement Legislation in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2000/001027bvb.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International and Commercial Regulation). He contended that the
violation of the WTO rules resulted from ". . . the fact that U.S. exporters receive a more
favorable corporate tax rate than U.S. domestic sellers, for income generated in the
U.S .. " Id.
133 2001 Panel Report, supra note 16, Annex D-4 para. 18.
134 Id. para. 4.
135 Id. para. 8.10 (citing Appellate Body Report, supra note 25, para. 179).
136 Id. (discussing Member autonomy to devise its own system of taxation); see also
id. para. 8.95 (legitimating the goal of designing measures to avoid the double taxation
of foreign-source income through its rigorous review of the FSC Act in determining
whether it qualified as such a measure).
137 Perkins, supra note 7, at 714. Reports indicate that the EU is poised to seek"..
nearly $4.1 billion in annual trade sanctions on U.S. exports to Europe ...." MANAGING
EXPORTS, supra note 10, at 5.
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substantive effect on member nations' domestic laws, have both
been questioned. On the side of the WTO, one analyst contends
that "[i]f international trade obligations are to have meaning, then
the WTO must have robust authority to outlaw attempts to
circumvent its rules."' 3 8 Others weigh in on the side of the United
States, finding that the latest WTO ruling "infringe[s] unjustifiably
on United States sovereignty by forcing the United States to adopt
a whole new system of taxation."' 39 One scholar asserts that in
order to resolve this dispute, major trading nations, like those in
the EC, that rely substantially on value added tax regimes (VATs)
will need to accept the regimes of other countries, such as the
United States, which seek to do virtually the same thing: adjust the
income taxation of export activity.
40
V. Conclusion
The latest WTO Panel decision in the thirty-year tax debate
between the United States and other members of the international
trading community clarifies certain aspects of international trade
agreements, but leaves other areas ambiguous and undefined.
Through its intent-based analysis, the Panel gave meaning to the
138 Funk, supra note 4, at 75 (asserting that the WTO would have deemed rules
imposed on member nations "essentially elective" and allowed members to either
"choose to comply with the intent of WTO obligations, or evade them through technical
compliance while flouting the substance," had it not enforced both the intent and literal
meaning of such rules). Id.
139 Perkins, supra note 7, at 716. In fact, concerns have been raised regarding the
legitimacy and ability of the WTO to resolve tax disputes. Avi-Yonah, supra note 132
(discussing 'WTO's lack of expertise on tax matters and members' reluctance to
relinquish their sovereignty to the WTO); Jeffrey Goldfarb, Barshefsky Questions WTO's
Efficacy for Major Dispute Between EU and U.S., 17 INT'L TRADE REP. 1849, 1849
(2000) (noting U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky's concerns over whether
the WTO "is the best place for large trading partners like the United States and Europe to
be resolving their quarrels"). See David Hardesty, Will WTO Ruling End a Tax Break
for U.S. Exporters?, E-COMMERCE TAX NEWS (Apr. 16, 2000), at http://www.
ecommercetax.com/doc/041600.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation) (discussing the issue of sovereignty and
relating that there is a "substantial element of Congress that opposes giving authority to
the WTO to dictate U.S. tax policy" as these "members of Congress see the WTO as a
step towards world government"); see also Kahn, supra note 1, at Al (relating that the
dispute over U.S. tax provisions may provide WTO opponents with "fresh ammunition
to argue the organization does more harm than good").
140 See Stanley I. Langbein, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 555 (2000). See supra note 60
for more discussion on the EC's VAT scheme.
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purpose of the agreements involved, particularly the SCM
Agreement.'41 By refusing to accept U.S. claims that the FSC Act
was WTO-compliant and by subjecting the FSC Act to its rigorous
analysis, the Panel revealed that requirements mandated by WTO
agreements must be considered by member nations in formulating
their systems of taxation. Additionally, the WTO, as an
institution, emerges as a formidable regulator of member nations'
tax laws that impact international trade.
While the applicability and supremacy of both the WTO and
its rules are clear, member nations' options in the design and
defense of their tax regimes are not as certain. The Panel's
decision instructs that the "to avoid" requirement guarding access
to the potential affirmative defense to prohibited subsidies presents
a significant hurdle, while the viability of the defense itself is left
unanswered. 142  By claiming the authority to determine the
prevailing domestic standard of taxation of a particular member,
despite that member's characterization of its tax system, the Panel
fosters uncertainty among members in the formulation of their tax
policies. The Panel also intimated that a worldwide system of
taxation could include measures to avoid the double taxation of
foreign-source income, while complying with both the letter and
spirit of WTO rules. 143  In roughly thirty years of trying, the
United States, however, has been unable to devise such a system.
On October 15, 2001, the United States filed a notice of appeal
with the WTO Appellate Body,' which issued a ruling affirming
141 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
144 Aziz Nishtar, U.S. Treasury Official Discusses New International Tax
Developments, 24 TAx NOTES INT'L 475, 475 (2001), available at LEXIS 2001 WTD
204-3. United States Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick states that the United
States appealed because it believes the "decision was in error." Press Release, Office of
the United States Trade Representative, United States to Appeal WTO Ruling on
FSC/ETI Tax Law (Oct. 10, 2001), at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/10/01-80.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation) [hereinafter Press Release]. On November 6, 2001, the EC filed its cross-
appeal in which it raised procedural objections regarding the provision of information to
third parties and requested that the Appellate Body review "all issues under original
consideration," should it reverse the Panel's decision. Myrna Zelaya-Quesada, EU
Commission Files Cross-Appeal With WTO Regarding FSC Replacement
Reconsideration, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 1826, 1827 (2001).
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the Panel's decision on January 14, 2002.145 In response to the
final ruling of the Appellate Body, U.S. trade representative
Robert Zoellick expressed disappointment but admitted that the
ruling "was not unexpected."' 14
6
As a result of the Appellate Body's ruling, the question facing
the United States has shifted from whether it should reform its tax
code to the extent to which it should reform its tax code. 147 One
option open to the United States is to completely restructure its
system of taxation to a territorial model. While some strongly
advocate such a move, 48 others predict it would entail problems
149
145 WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations," Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European
Communities, WT/DSI08/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispu-e/108abrwe.pdf. The Appellate Body recommended that the
United States bring its tax laws, namely the FSC Repeal Act, "into conformity with its
obligations" under the SCM Agreement and Article 111:4 of GATT 1994. Id. at para.
257.
146 David E. Rosenbaum & Elizabeth Olson, U.S. Loses Trade Case to Europeans
on Offshore Tax Havens, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2002, at Cl. As Zoellick's comment
reflects, the likelihood of the United States succeeding on appeal was doubtful given the
fact that "no final WTO panel ruling has ever been reversed on appeal." MANAGING
EXPORTS, supra note 10, at 5. The chance of reversal was also deemed unlikely as the
WTO "rules are pretty clear" that "[i]f a country maintains a worldwide tax system for
its businesses, then it must impose the same tax on profits that are earned from domestic
sales and international sales." Daniel J. Mitchell, WTO Edict Requires Global Tax
Repair, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 31, 2001, at A14, http://www.heritage.org/
views/2001/ed073101.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation); see also Scott, supra note 9, at 218 (noting that former
international tax counsel for the U.S. Treasury seriously doubted the United States'
ability to persuade the WTO that the FSC Act does not furnish U.S. companies with
prohibited export subsidies).
147 Under WTO dispute settlement procedures, since the FSC Act has been
adjudicated by the Appellate Body to be a violation of WTO rules if the United States
fails to correct the violation, the EC "would be able to slap steep tariffs on a wide range
of goods." Mitchell, supra note 146, at A14. On November 17, 2000, the EC disclosed
a preliminary list of U.S. imports that might be targeted for sanctions. Daniel Pruzin,
U.S. Challenges Sanctions Requested by EU in FSC Dispute, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. 1814,
1814 (2000). Included on the list were "goods such as, steel, meat products, cereals,
textiles, and aircraft." Id. Some of the items specifically excluded were "chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, plastics, rubber articles, and beverages." Id. EU
Ambassador to the WTO, Carlos Trojan, commented that the preliminary list of potential
trade sanctions was "deliberately vague so as to avoid any escalation of the feud with the
United States." Daniel Pruzin et al., EU Unveils FSC Hit List, Asks WTO to Clear More
Than $4 Billion in Trade Sanctions, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. 1764, 1765 (2000).
148 The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Rep. Bill Thomas (R-
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and that it is also unlikely to occur under the current political
regime. 150
Alternatively, the United States could maintain its current
worldwide system of taxation and enact new legislation aimed at
curing its WTO violations. Due to the fondness, and, in some
cases, dependency, that has developed between U.S. corporations
and the tax exemptions, 151 the prognosis of legislation proposing to
eliminate or substantially reduce tax savings to U.S. exporters is
grave. 
152
Calif.), strongly opposed appealing the Panel decision as he felt that "dragging out the
process through extensive appeals or cosmetic changes to our tax system will not solve
the problem." Daniel Pruzin et al., WTO Issues Final Ruling Maintaining Interim
Findings Against U.S. FSC/ETI, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 1183, 1183 (2001). Rather,
Thomas urged that the "WTO's decision should serve as a catalyst for immediate [tax]
reform." Id. Similarly, one analyst contends that using the adverse WTO ruling as an
impetus to move to a territorial system of taxation "is the tax equivalent of making
lemonade out of lemons." Mitchell, supra note 146. Mitchell presents three arguments
in favor of a shift to the territorial model. First, he contends it would increase the
competitiveness of American companies. Second, it would be less costly and
burdensome than complying with the complexities inherent in worldwide systems.
Lastly, the territorial system is "clearly permissible according to the VTO." Id.
149 At the International Fiscal Association conference in October 2001, panelists
agreed that "a move to a territorial tax system wouldn't solve the problems that many
observers think it would." Scott, supra note 9, at 219. These panelists explain that under
a territorial model "while income generated abroad is tax-exempt, income from exports
is not." Id. Thus, they conclude that under such a system, there is no incentive to export;
rather, the incentive is to produce goods abroad, which results in "a clear disadvantage to
the home country." Id.
150 Former international tax counsel for the U.S. Treasury, Philip R. West,
commented that while the United States could "decide to move from a worldwide tax
system toward a more broadly territorial one," it is unlikely because, while President
Bush and some members of Congress might support such a move, "the opposition
Democrat-controlled Senate probably would block it .... " Scott, supra note 9, at 219.
151 For example, in 1998, Boeing used the tax exemptions to save $130 million,
giving it a "crucial edge in its competition with the European consortium Airbus
Industrie for global aircraft sales." Kahn, supra note 1, at Al. The tax savings
continued for Boeing; its 2000 financial statements indicated that tax savings through
FSCs amounted to $291 million, roughly fourteen percent of Boeing's net earnings for
the year. EU Commission, supra note 65, para. 237.
152 A letter to President George W. Bush from seventy-four top U.S. executives
urged him to appeal the Panel decision and reminded the President that "[o]ur companies
are among the strongest supporters of the Administration's trade policies." The
executives stressed the importance of the tax exemptions and hinted that a decision not to
appeal would cost the President their support, remarking that they "have worked closely
with the Administration in a number of areas and look forward to continuing to do so."
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Thus, regardless of its form, the reformation effort will not be
solely focused on achieving WTO compliance, as the pressure to
aid U.S. exporters remains a substantial consideration. If the
United States is unable to strike an acceptable balance between
these two goals, the resulting legislation is likely to be challenged
by the EC, further perpetuating the cycle the United States has
been caught in for over three decades of amending its tax laws and
appealing WTO decisions.
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National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., CEOs Ask U.S. President Bush to Resolve ETI
Dispute, 23 TAx NOTES INT'L 964 (2001), LEXIS 2001 WTD 154-27.
[Vol. 27
